Violence in Sri Lanka

{192} Virtue, Violence, and Engagement in Therāvada and Sri Lankan Buddhism
SACP Forum for Asian and Comparative Philosophy. Vol. 23, No. 47, Fall 2006, 192-216
Eric Sean Nelson
University of Massachusetts Lowell

Abstract
Several scholars have argued that Buddhist ethics is a variety of virtue ethics. I argue in this paper that the virtue ethics character of Therāvada Buddhism clarifies issues of war and violence, compassion and peace in traditional Therāvada and contemporary Sri Lankan Buddhism. The problems revealed by the relation between Buddhism, politics, and violence in Asia should serve as a caution to and a source of self-reflection for the contemporary project of socially engaged Buddhism. Given the everyday logic of circumstances and making exceptions, and consequently the possibility of acting from the condition of exception and emergency as the norm, as well as the customary division between friend and enemy, ethical and social norms and practices—no matter how well intentioned and altruistic, such as in the canonical Therāvada ethics of loving kindness (metta), generosity (dana), and compassion (karuna)—can potentially be used to reproduce and intensify rather than resolve social conflicts. Thus, despite the many merits of the recent ethical and religious turns in contemporary thought and culture, the related privatization of social-political issues into private ones of charity and compassion can result in ideological blindness to and precarious one-sidedness in addressing issues of social justice. The ethical requires an understanding of and concern with society beyond individual attitudes, intentions, and virtues if it is not to become unethical and abstract cult of virtue or misused in the name of religious, moral, national, and ethnic identities.

1. Introduction
Morality, meditation, and wisdom constitute the three-fold basis of Therāvada Buddhist practice. As the foundation and prerequisite of the path, virtue (sila) is the first part of Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa’s great commentary Visuddhimagga.[1] Therāvada Buddhist ethics is a variety of virtue ethics because it emphasizes: (1) morality (sila) as a way of life rather than a system of rules, (2) the cultivation of morality through precepts and as perfections and virtues, {193} (3) moral psychology, which is richly developed in the Pali Suttas and commentaries, and (4) the need for skillfulness, fittingness, and appropriateness in applying morality to the situation.[2] Although Therāvada ethics differs from other kinds of virtue ethics in a number of significant ways, such as its focus on the actual and concrete suffering of the other and of all sentient beings, it is comparable to Aristotelian and Confucian ethics in stressing the need for the cultivation of an apt ethical discernment that is responsive to the context through the suitable application of morality.[3]
Whereas appropriateness is secondary to principle in rule-based ethics and to command and law in the legalism of command theory, virtue ethics is defined by the recognition that appropriateness is not accidental but constitutive of the ethical. Ethical life calls for the development of moral sensibility or judgment, since the richness and complexity of life cannot be adequately articulated and addressed through an abstract system of mechanical rules or rigid commands. Some might object that Buddhism has no ethics but only calls for a non-moral meditative insight into the causality of karma. This view of karmic determinism is clearly false. For the Buddha, as he is said to state repeatedly throughout the Sutta Nipata, the path is intrinsically ethical although morality alone is insufficient for liberation (SN IV.898). Buddhism is about deeds rather than rules and rites (SN II. 249-250). One should focus on moral conduct, virtue and responsibility instead of the fate or destiny of caste or birth (SN I. 136-140, III. 462, III. 648-650); since there is no shelter except the actual good we have done (AN III. 51).[4]
Given that family resemblances and analogies do not entail identity, it is important not to conflate Buddhist with other varieties of virtue ethics. This context-sensitive and flexible responsiveness articulated in Buddhism is not based in political prudence, interpreted as discriminatory judgment, and the hierarchy of social relations legitimated by Aristotelian ethics. Buddhist social ethics is often interpreted as being more republican and egalitarian, due to the Buddha’s historical origins and message,[5] and Buddhist virtues are oriented towards mindfulness developed and disclosed in meditative practices. The primary example of such mindfulness is the Buddha himself as the embodiment of a purely skillful and spontaneous ethical responsiveness towards all beings. This openness and situatedness also opens up possibilities for misunderstanding and misapplication when the person acts, speaks, and thinks without mindfulness. The lack of mindfulness might generate the conclusion that the first precept {194} of non-harm (ahimsa) can be bracketed in the name of another good such as the protection of Buddhism. Such a perspective is found in utilitarian interpretations of Buddhist ethics, where the lives of the many might outweigh one life, and in the phenomenon that has been described as “Buddhist fundamentalism.” The latter is more aptly described as the nationalistic and communalistic cooption of Buddhism, since it is not based in the authority of the Pali Canon (which the word fundamentalism would suggest).[6] The Buddhist Suttas forbid violence and call for non-attachment even ultimately to Buddhism itself. Such non-attachment is often conflated with indifference.[7] Yet it is clear from the Pali canon that the Buddha is never portrayed as advocating moral indifference to the fate of others. On the contrary, the noble person is: “One who is devoted to one’s own welfare and cultivates the virtues, while at the same time [being] devoted to the welfare of others by causing others to cultivate their virtues.”[8] The treatment of Buddhism as a reified cultural identity and possession is at odds with its moral content, which explicitly calls for taking up others well-being, and in particular its universalism and cosmopolitanism that extends to the entirety of sentient life. The violent promotion of Buddhism as a particular way of life conflicts with the very practice and aim of that way of life. This problematic nexus between Buddhism and the political is as much an issue for contemporary “engaged Buddhism” as it is for traditional Buddhism.
Nevertheless, utilitarian and contextualist readings imply that in some cases moral agents are justified in sacrificing their own virtues and the goods and lives of others for the sake of a greater good. For instance, in common dilemmas from moral philosophy, agents might be justified in killing one person who would otherwise kill hundreds or thousands. The argument that it is legitimate for the first precept demanding ahimsa to be suspended under limited exceptional circumstances, i.e., in order to assimilate some forms of self-defense, is itself conditional, since it is clear from the Suttas that karmic responsibility is unavoidable. Violence only creates more violence and, no matter how necessary or legitimate it seems, always has its consequences such that the end can not cleanse or sanctify the means. But even given this understanding, individuals and groups have felt compelled for various reasons to engage in violence, and with some justification in cases of self-defense.
Reflection on the history of South and South-East Asia illustrates that the Buddha’s commitment to non-harm and non-violence has often been in tension with political institutions {195} that have never abandoned the right to use force and established social practices involving the mistreatment of other humans and animals. The idea that ahimsa is a primary virtue has coexisted with its repeated violation. Since the canonical virtue of ahimsa can be overridden by the weight of circumstances in societies that have claimed to promote the Dhamma, it is worthwhile to consider the logic at work in the justification of internal coercion and external war. This raises the question of whether violence is inherently incompatible with the Dhamma, as the Buddha is generally portrayed as advocating, or whether there is a “Buddhist just war theory” based on other canonical sources and non-canonical popular “lived” practices and ways of reasoning?[9]

2. Engaging Buddhism?
In multiple senses Buddhism is inherently ethically engaged. Buddhism is about practices and a way of life, and the Buddha called for the appropriate practice of the virtues (SN I. 73). Compassion, generosity, and loving-kindness are primary Therāvada virtues. These are genuinely altruistic and other-oriented since they are ultimately not done out of any “need” but out of freedom (SN I. 25). Although Richard Gombrich is correct when he asserts that the Buddha’s primary goal was not social reform but spiritual liberation,[10] the historical Buddha remains an ethical model and exemplar who confronted social injustices, such as caste hierarchy and the exclusion of “untouchables,” and the social pathologies of violence and war. He did not do so because he was commanded to do so to avoid punishment by a divine being. He is described as responding immanently from out of his own condition to the concrete suffering of others. To the degree that the traditional account of the Buddha is accurate, it was precisely being affected by the other’s suffering—the disquiet, sickness, old age, and death of others—that set him on the path of awakening.[11] This encounter with and uncalculated response to suffering provided the basis for kamma (karma) becoming ethical and the universe a basically moral arena in early Buddhism.[12]
Assuming it is true that socially engaged Buddhism is a relatively new and western inspired phenomenon, then something else must be meant besides traditional forms of Buddhist ethical engagement for sentient life. First, this claim is inaccurate: Engaged Buddhism is not merely a contemporary western construct insofar as there are qualities in traditional Buddhism {196} allowing contemporary western redeployments. Western interpretations have often focused on the individualism of Buddhism, and there are elements emphasizing working for one’s own salvation. Yet Asian Buddhists have interpreted it as inherently social. Kamma inherently binds one to others, forming a network of freedom and fate, and responsibility extends beyond the immediacy of the moment into the past and future of this and other lives.[13] Further, a number of contemporary ethical issues such as the ethical status of animals and the environment are arguably more fully articulated in Buddhist than in traditional western discourses. Secondly, the notion of social engagement said to be lacking in traditional Buddhism is not so much a traditional Christian idea, which is not necessarily altruistic or purely ethical in the Kantian sense since charity is done for the reward of salvation rather than purely for its own sake, as it is a modern one emerging from the moral and political thought of the enlightenment.[14] The modern focus on social activism and engagement is motivated by enlightenment ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity and the social movements of the Nineteenth and Twentieth-Centuries. As varied responses of historical agents, who can interpret and engage their contexts and are not the mere passive product of colonial hegemony, anti-colonial liberation struggles involve a multiplicity of traditions and inspirations that are more than their Western and Christian sources.
Socially engaged Buddhism, inconceivable without its Asian sources, brings traditions of Buddhist ethical reflection to bear on contemporary moral and social issues. If ethical insights of the Dhamma are needed in a world that all too readily resorts to intolerance, persecution, and violence, then mindfulness of the possible dangers (whether to non-Buddhists or to Buddhists themselves) of inappropriately and unskillfully engaging Buddhist ethics remains vital to such engagement for peace, social justice, and the common welfare. These dangers are apparent in the history of Asian Buddhism and should serve to stimulate Western reflection on the character and potential consequences of moral and political engagement.
The first danger is the possibility of the Dhamma being appropriated by and limited to a political program such that it becomes part of the ideological legitimation of problematic political practices and institutions. One is unlikely to critically engage a political order with which one is complicit. In engaging politics, Buddhism—like any other philosophy, religion, or way of life—risks becoming an instrument of the state or a party. Providing an ethical basis for action also means establishing a foundation for the justification and legitimation of action. On {197} the one hand, this makes ethics and moral judgment possible. On the other hand, it opens up the danger of losing the ethical in its very institutionalization. There are numerous historical examples that show how moral values and ideals are used to excuse horror such that peace becomes war, justice turns into injustice, humanitarian compassion justifies violence, and freedom is turned into tyranny. Connections with the state, the military, political parties and economic powers have at times morally compromised Buddhism and can do so again in the future. This is not without its rationale within Buddhism, which often—analogously to the Christian two kingdom doctrine—either accommodated itself to the state or left it to its own devices.[15]
Social engagement or activism, which counters tendencies toward the privatization of moral questions, is by itself an insufficient condition or criterion. Buddhism should not be reduced to engagement because it is “other-worldly” but insofar as engagement blinds one to the need for mindfulness and comprehension (sampajano) in general and comprehension of suitability (sappaya sampajano) or the “art of practicality” in particular. This art involves the skillfulness in the choice of the right means (upaya-kusala in Pali, upaya-kausalya in Sanskrit) for the right situation at the right moment. This virtue is one that the Buddha possesses preeminently and, according to several interpretations of Therāvada Buddhism, perhaps exclusively.
Although the Dhamma is oriented towards peace, moral responsibility and compassion, a second danger can be seen in attempts to use Buddhism to justify violence and war. The various forms of Japanese Buddhism, subordinated to the interests of the Imperial state and state-Shinto after the persecutions of the Meiji era, became part of a militaristic system of justifying expansion, colonization, and war.[16] It was the reduction of the Dhamma to socio-political interests that legitimated acting contrary to the Dhamma. Distinguishing “reactionary” and “progressive” engagement by itself does not resolve this issue. Imperial Japan is an extreme example, but this question can be raised in contemporary contexts. There are Buddhists who actively work for the non-violent resolution of the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict, for example the Buddhists involved in Sarvodaya Shramadana, while other Buddhists have played a significant role in intensifying the conflict. We can thus find two conflicting models of socially engaged Buddhism in contemporary Sri Lanka, at least one of which is deeply problematic.
{198} What lessons should be drawn from morally problematic uses of Buddhism? Are there sources within Buddhist teaching, as Brian Victoria has argued of Zen and Tessa Bartholomeusz of Sri Lankan Therāvada, which potentially legitimate violence and war?[17] The First Precept, or first moral rule, of Buddhism seems clear: I undertake the precept to refrain from destroying living creatures (Panatipata veramani sikkhapadam samadiyami). The first precept of ahimsa, a vow taken to dedicate oneself to non-harm and non-violence, does not seem a promising start for justifying violence and yet it is not the case that individuals and groups claiming to be Buddhist have never engaged in violence. One can blame this on the imperfection of human character, and accordingly people often distinguish the pleasant ideal from the unpleasant reality. This separation of norms and practices, besides being dualistic, precludes critical discussion and leaves unanswered the question of whether there are possible sources within Buddhist teaching for departing from the moral demand of ahimsa to not harm sentient beings.

3. Questioning Violence and War
The obligation to cultivate compassion, loving-kindness, respect, and reverence for all human and sentient life does not seem a hopeful beginning for the justification of war. The argument that it is better to suffer harm than to do harm appears less auspicious. Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike often take for granted that there is no legitimate Buddhist justification of war much less a Buddhist tradition of just-war theory. To use violence is to betray the Buddha’s teachings: “There is a person who abstains from the destruction of life; with the rod and the weapon laid aside, he is conscientious and kindly and dwells compassionately towards all living beings.”[18]
There are noticeable historical exceptions to the obvious interpretation of the Buddha’s first precept demanding non-harm. Traditional Buddhist kings have raised and used armies. Buddhist monks have developed and used martial arts. In Medieval China and Japan, monks have justified killing, carried weapons, formed armies, and been involved in rebellions.[19] Tibetan Buddhism tells of a future king who will militarily liberate them from external oppression in the stories associated with Shambhala and the Kalachakra Tantra. Japanese Buddhists supported the expansion of imperial Japan. There are questionable relations between Buddhists and the military in countries such as Burma and Thailand. Currently in Sri Lanka, {199} Therāvada monks and laity have been implicated in persecution and violence in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict and civil war.
Because of (1) the Buddha's rejection of violence and war as a legitimate means of achieving one's ends and (2) the long history and dedication to peace and non-violent social change in the Buddhist tradition, it is important to reflect on these historical exceptions. The powerful ethical character of Buddhism can be seen from the Buddha’s critique of war, violence and social injustice to more contemporary movements as diverse as the Vietnamese peace movement of the 1960s, the Tibetan struggle for religious freedom, the Burmese pro-democracy movement, and in Sir Lanka the lay Sarvodaya Shramadana movement for peace, communal self-help, and popular empowerment.
Counterexamples to normative Buddhism, which was a plural and contested Asian “construct” before it was a western one, implicitly reveal the moral character of Buddhism in limiting and countering the drive to hatred, violence and war by the very fact that violence is deeply problematic in Buddhism. Those claiming to be Buddhists who engage in war are forced to appeal to the limited and contested (in Buddhist thought) idea of self-defense or to a questionable antinomian non-attachment to the ethical core of Buddhism itself—loving-kindness and compassion. Although one cannot and should not expect to exclude all possibilities for self-defense and especially non-violent resistance, practices contradicting this minimalist idea reveal that other motives and self-deception can be at work. Rather than there being a general “antinomianism” or “nihilism” inherently at work in Buddhism, the problem lies in the ambiguity about moral appropriateness, including skillful means and skillfulness in Buddhism. Buddhist ethics does not advocate the application of one single rule or principle that is eternally and universally valid in all cases but involves ethics understood as (1) appropriateness, (2) a way of life and (3) part of the way. Although it is not the end or entirety of the Buddhist path, morality is its necessary prerequisite.[20]
Because of the virtue-ethical and context-sensitive character of Buddhism, a number of Buddhists and non-Buddhists suggest that there is a condition beyond ethical virtues and appropriateness. The art of suitability and skillfulness should direct the mind to considering the context and the level of understanding of oneself and others. This prudential context-sensitivity can be misunderstood as an excuse for unethical behavior among some Buddhist individuals and {200} groups. Buddhist ethics at its simplest levels appeals to prudential self-interest, especially through the popular logic of merit and merit transfer,[21] yet continuing to act out of self-interested motives is canonically considered only the lowest level of moral action.[22] Egotistical self-interest and attachment to one's own individual or group superiority undermines the basic equality of sentient beings that is asserted in the Buddhist tradition as well as the fundamental practices and virtues of loving kindness (metta), generosity (dana), and compassion (karuna).
It is fair to say that Buddhism does not endorse the use of violence. Still it is untrue that Buddhists—or at least individuals and groups claiming to be Buddhists and engaging in at least some of the practices associated with Buddhism—never engage in acts of war, hatred, and conflict. This is no doubt caused by human imperfection. Nevertheless, it should not just be accepted as human imperfection, since such actions always involve accruing kamma (karma) and Buddhism insists that beings strive for and realize universal wisdom and compassion. The Buddhist emphasis on non-attachment, including to itself, and developing universal compassion and self-criticism, especially of inadequate understandings of Buddhism, demands a greater emphasis on and means to critique one's own behavior towards others. The aggressive and brutal colonialism justified by Japanese Buddhists, the right-wing rhetoric and practices of some Sri Lankan monks and laity, and the connections between Buddhism and the military in Burma, serve as important examples of the dangers of treating Buddhism as a cultural possession or ideology of political legitimation, of taking it as an end rather than a means and a way.[23]

4. The Question of Moral Appropriateness
Tessa Bartholomeusz, whose detailed critical account of just war thinking in Sri Lanka I will partly rely on and partly critically modify in section five, has located the issue of violence in the pragmatic and prudential character of Buddhist ethics.[24] She is correct to the extent that Buddhist ethics is not based in rigidly following one principle or rule but is a way of life grounded in the cultivation of multiple precepts or virtues. Even authors such as David Kalupahana, for whom Buddhist ethics is principally an ethics of principle, acknowledge that the principle can be modified according to new circumstances.[25] When there are new circumstances or a conflict between two different virtues or moral rules, this question becomes pressing: one must decide the moral dilemma through a sense of what is appropriate. When a principle {201} becomes uncertain, it can only be interpreted rather than mechanically applied. A system of rules does not provide an infinite number of further rules explaining how to apply them. That is, there cannot be, on pain of infinite regress, another principle stating how to apply the first principle. This means that there is no further precept to explain the first precept of ahimsa. In cases of moral conflict, one has to adjudicate the sense of ahimsa through the context of Buddhist ethics as a whole and the pressing features of the situation itself. This raises the question of whether the first precept can be outweighed at times by other considerations such as utilitarian considerations of sacrificing one life in order to save multiple lives. Can one then in exceptional circumstances destroy or allow one life to be destroyed in order to save the lives of a community or multitude of individuals?
This reasoning about exceptions and the force of necessity is not only an abstract and speculative question. It has occurred within Buddhist historical traditions and has given birth to a Buddhist tradition that has been likened by some scholars to western “just-war theory” Just war theory seeks to explain the circumstances under which it might be legitimate or at least necessary to take life in armed conflict. Whereas scholars of Therāvada such as Damien Keown have argued that killing can sometimes be a legitimate response to suffering, other scholars such as Rupert Gethin have rejected this argument since it does not address dukkha as a reality that must be understood and worked through rather than suppressed.[26] The issue is not that people claiming to be Buddhists at times engage in violence and war in the name of self-defense. It is difficult if not impossible to demand the saintliness according to which it is illegitimate to defend one’s parents, family, friends or community under any circumstances. The problem is the “slippery slope,” i.e., when and how this reasoning can go wrong and become an ideological excuse for morally illegitimate violence and war.
The expression “Skill in means” or “skillful means” (Sanskrit, upayakausalya; Pali, upayakusala) is a basic Mahāyāna concept, developed in the context of the compassion and wisdom of the Bodhisattva, and rarely found in the Pali canon. The roots of this expression, both upaya (“way, means or resource”) and in particular kusala (“skillful, profitable or expedient,” often used as equivalent for “good, moral, wholesome”), are present in the Pali Canon.[27] Upaya, the ability of the Buddha to teach at different levels according to the understanding of the recipients, is restricted to the Buddha. Kusala—skillfulness and wholesomeness as opposed to {202} unskillfulness and unwholesomeness—in action, thought, and word is advocated for all following the path in Therāvada Buddhism.[28] The use of a number of expressions indicating different abilities and capacities requiring appropriateness and skillfulness—such as kusala, sappaya, upaya, and yoniso manasikārā (wise or appropriate attention), ugghatitaññu (swiftness of understanding), patisambhida (the knowledge to appropriately discriminate things)—can be seen in the Pali Canon.
For the Buddha, in the Sangiti Sutta of the Digha Nikaya, there are “three kinds of skill: skill in progress, skill in regress, and skill in means” (tini kosallani: aya kosallam, apaya kosallam, upaya kosallam).[29] The use of upaya kosallam in this context shows that skillful means is not foreign to the sense of skillfulness in the Pali Canon and that it is not limited to the Buddha, at the same time as the Buddha perfectly embodies such skillfulness.[30] Skill in the Buddha’s discourses does not seem to mean casuistry, cleverness or a merely calculative pragmatic prudence that is more political than ethical. It is an art that cultivates a moral ability and insight consisting of appropriately applying the Dhamma to the situation. This is confirmed by another reference to the aptness of skillfulness in the Nava Sutta of the Sutta Nipata, where it is said that that the one who knows Dhamma is like the skillful boatman who is able to ferry others across a dangerous river (SN II.8). Here again appropriateness is explained as being like an art or craft such that it is not simply the mechanical application of an abstract principle.
In another passage, understanding what is fitting and skillfully attending is the basis of wisdom.[31] In the Avijja Sutta, skillfulness is associated with knowing and ignorance, when the Buddha is said to discuss how ignorance leads to unskillful qualities and knowing to skillful ones (SN XLV.1, also compare SN XLIX.1). In The Group of Ones, appropriateness and skillfulness are interconnected such that both are essential to the path: “A bhikkhu who attends appropriately abandons what is unskillful and develops what is skillful” (Itivuttaka, 16). This use of “skillful,” which points to the cultivation of spontaneous activity as in learning a craft to the point where it becomes second nature, is not accidental to the Buddha’s discourses.
Not only morality, but also meditation is often compared to a skill that requires development. For example, in the Anguttara Nikaya, the Buddha is said to say: “Just as, monks, an archer or his apprentice might practice on a straw man or a pile of clay, and thereby later become a long-distance shot, an impeccable marksman who can fell a large body, just so it is {203} with a monk who reaches the destruction of the taints in dependence on the first jhana.”[32] This sense of skill provides a partial basis for the later Mahāyāna reinterpretation and extension of skillfulness (kusala) as skilful means or skill in means (upayakausalya). In early Mahāyāna texts such as The Skill in Means Sutra (Upayakausalya Sutra), and canonical texts such as The Lotus Sutra, morality is fully absorbed into or subordinated to compassion such that the compassion of the Bodhisattva transcends the cultivation of the precepts considered as rules or virtues.[33]
Insofar as Therāvada ethics, like most Buddhist and many forms of non-Buddhist ethics such as Aristotelian and Confucian, is a form of virtue ethics it faces the issue of appropriate action. If this is the case, then acting from the precepts, and the Vinaya in general, cannot be reduced to legalistic external conformity with them. Codes, precepts, and rules demand the ability to distinguish between the hypocrisy of breaking them for one’s own advantage and the moral insight to adopt them to circumstances. For example, a Sri Lankan bikkhu should not possess money, yet it might not be inappropriate for him to carry money for purposes that are difficult to avoid such as carrying bus fare to get across town.[34] Rules cannot be mechanically applied but require the skillful application of the Dhamma in acting in the proverbial right way at the right time in the right place.[35] A third source of the use of skillfulness in contemporary Therāvada Buddhism would be from the growing knowledge of Mahāyāna traditions of interpretation.
Is the Buddhist notion of skillfulness too open or ambiguous such that it can possibly justify unethical behavior in the name of a greater good? Can it potentially be used to justify behavior contrary to the basic ethical principles of Buddhism such as the Buddha’s critique of violence and war? This question of skillfulness seems a more basic issue than that of ethical antinomianism and nihilism developed in some critiques of Buddhism, since context-sensitive appropriateness would provide the justification for going “beyond good and evil” and other such expressions. This is not only a potential problem in Zen or Mahāyāna but in all Buddhism, given that the issue of appropriateness is already significant in the Pali Canon and in contemporary Therāvada Buddhism.

{204} 5. Buddhism and Conflict in Contemporary Sri Lanka
The Sri Lankan conflict has its origins in the development of Sinhalese nationalism in response to British colonialism and during the post-war independence movement. The British played off Sinhalese and Tamil interests and sentiments in order to retain power during the colonial period, much as they did in their other colonies. The postcolonial period saw the deepening of various narratives of ethic self-identity among both the Sinhalese and the Tamil populations. Successive democratically elected Sri Lankan governments have reflected the interests and aspirations of the Sinhalese, contributing to Tamil sentiments of disentitlement. The resulting episodic civil war has killed over 65,000 people since the 1980s.
The ethnic conflict has occurred between a series of elected governments, led by various parities from the right to the left who have been supported by the mostly Buddhist Sinhalese majority, and the terrorist—insofar as suicide bombings, assassinations, eliminating all Tamil rivals, etc., are terrorist—and or self-described “liberation” organization Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) organization based in the mostly non-Buddhist Tamil minority.[36] The best option for both sides would be a peaceful resolution and mutual cooperation, which seems presently unlikely. On the one hand, there is much to criticize in the Sri Lankan government and Sinhalese nationalists, from conservative Buddhists to socialist populists, who have flamed the passions of war. On the other hand, the legitimate grievances of the Tamil population are used to support an authoritarian, nationalistic, and violent organization.[37]
Critics of Buddhism, including contemporary western engaged Buddhists who want to free Buddhism from its traditional Asian contexts, point to both Imperial Japan and the current conflict in Sri Lanka as examples proving traditional Buddhism’s deep complicity with violence, exploitation, and domination. This argument appeals, in the case of Sri Lanka, to the fact that various Therāvada Buddhist monks and laity have been implicated in various forms of violence and calls for violence against the LTTE and/or the Tamil population. Any adequate consideration of this conflict begins to reveal the need for a more nuanced and differentiating approach to the question of what role Buddhism plays in the current conflict. This conflict raises two significant questions: (1) what is the role of Buddhism in promoting the conflict? (2) What are the arguments for and against the justice of war in the Buddhist traditions of Sri Lanka? The second question can be made more exact in the following terms: What possible justifications of violence {205} are there in (i) the Pali Canon, (ii) tales about Asoka and the universal wheel-turning monarch (cakkavatti) as well as postcanonical narratives such as the Mahavamsa,[38] and (iii) contemporary postcolonial Sri Lankan Buddhism?
In the remainder of this paper, I will begin to sketch out a possible answer addressing a few aspects of these questions. One strategy is to analyze Buddhist ideas in the context of western just-war and ethical theory and conclude that Buddhism as it is actually practiced in distinction from its normative ideal not only has a rigorous tradition of nonviolence and loving kindness but also a long history of thinking about war from which reasoned as well as opportunistic assertions of the possible justice or unfortunate necessity of war can emerge. Buddhism privileges non-violence and Buddhists have justified war under certain conditions.
Buddhism is a diverse set of norms and practices; this diversity is also true of Sri Lankan Buddhism where one can see three approaches to the question of war. First, there is a position which some call Buddhist fundamentalism. Fundamentalism suggests a return to the fundamentals of Buddhism, which would mean to renounce violence as a means. As Mahinda Deegalle argues this position is not so much Buddhist as it is Sinhalese nationalist, which appropriates Buddhism as a symbol of Sinhalese heritage and identity.[39] This raises the interesting question whether there is actually such a thing as religious fundamentalism. Many movements labeled as fundamentalist seem to be more about the use of the religious for nationalistic economic and political interests. The nationalist and “just war” positions can both appeal to the Mahavamsa, which describes the Buddha’s legendary visits to Sri Lanka and the military victories of ancient Sinhalese Buddhist kings against invading Hindu Tamils.[40]
The nationalists explicitly demands that the Sinhala-Tamil conflict must conclude not only with the defeat of the LTTE but with the restoration of a unified and fully Sinhalese and Buddhist Sri Lanka. Their argument for war generally follows a three step legitimation of anti-Tamil sentiment: (1) Sinhala and Buddhist identity constitute a unity that is radically distinct from the Dravidian Hindu Tamil interlopers from South India; (2) Sri Lanka is the island of Dhamma (dhammadwipa) ordained by the Buddha himself (during his three apocryphal visits) for Buddhism such that the whole island is a sacred relic of the Buddha’s and the loss of its integrity would destroy this legacy; (3) the justice of a defensive war for the Dhamma justifies the preservation of Sri Lanka in its unity as a majority Sinhalese Buddhist nation through {206} military action against the Tamils, identified with the invading damila of the medieval epics, thus associating the present dispute with past threats as well as the fear of tiny Sri Lanka being submerged in the vastness of India. Bartholomeusz contends that it is paradoxically Buddhist beliefs about pacifism—i.e., that Buddhists are more fair, tolerant, and peaceful—that leads Buddhists to differentiate themselves from others and turn to violence to protect that very ideal. The perceived need to preserve endangered Buddhist peacefulness creates the conditions for violence[41] Yet Buddhism is not so much the cause of such attitudes as it—or rather its surface historical facticity as uniquely Sinhalese—is instrumentally incorporated into conservative Sinhalese discourses and, more generally, the Sinhalese side of the “ethnic outbidding” that Neil DeVotta characterizes as a cancer eating away at Sri Lankan political life.[42]
The second range of views might be characterized as the moderate justification of the use of force, and maintains the justice of undertaking “defensive military action” against insurgencies. Even if the insurgents draw on some legitimate grievances. The war is interpreted as the defense of the territorial integrity and peace of the nation, as a proper function of the modern secular state, and/or the defense of the nation’s endangered Buddhist identity. This model appeals to the conventional model of international law and its account of the justice and limits of war as well as to Buddhist principles such as maximizing well-being. Assuming one is attacked, and if common well-being outweighs the well-being of the attacker, it is then justifiable to defend oneself, one’s parents and family, one’s fellow citizens, including if its involves violence and killing. This argument is of course reasonable, and self-defense is not without its pragmatic justification and traditional authority. The problem is that such arguments often move imperceptibly from the exceptional justification of minimal violence under “conditions of necessity” to the ideological normalization of the state of war. Violence, once it is justified as an exception, becomes the norm from which there seems no escape. The ethical looses its normative and critical force and becomes part of the social reproduction and intensification of conflict rather than a medium of its resolution.
There are multiple strategies used by Sri Lankans to answer the question of how Buddhists can justify engaging in conflict and war. Some stress the unfortunate necessity of military action despite its negative karmic consequences. Others, perhaps motivated by the need for a more inspirational message, suggest that righteous war (i.e., one with a morally legitimate {207} goal and fought in an honorable fashion with morally acceptable means) has meritorious karmic consequences. Both strategies presuppose that the precept of nonviolence is a prima facie rather than an absolute duty such that nonviolence is a first duty that can be overridden under certain circumstances as a last resort.[43]
Therāvada ethics, especially when it is interpreted textually through the Pali Canon, is seen as placing absolute value on acting out of compassion and avoiding harm. In practice, Sri Lankan Buddhists reason with a plurality of context-sensitive prima facie duties. The precept against violence is not absolute and can be overridden by more pressing obligations such as defense of one’s parents, country, or the Dhamma. The Buddha’s account of moral skillfulness suggests, according to this reading, the use of practical judgment or a sense of appropriateness to apply moral principles to the situation. The Buddha’s precepts are primary and conflicts between precepts require contextual reasoning that employs considerations that scholars have compared with utilitarian (maximizing compassion and minimizing suffering) and virtue ethical (the effects actions have on one’s condition) reasoning. In this way, Buddhist ethical reasoning is used to justify violence for the sake of nonviolence and the Sri Lankan government’s claim to wage “war for peace.” The justification of war requires the fulfillment of certain conditions comparable to Christian and western just war criteria. A number of Sri Lankan Buddhists, in line with traditional justifications of war in the Buddhist kingdoms of South-East Asia,[44] appeal to the Hindu Bhagavad-Gita and the Pan-Indic idea that raja (and ksatriya fulfilling their military duties) are exempt from ahimsa.
Historically numerous leaders and societies claiming to be Buddhist have had armies, police forces, prisons, etc., with actual weapons and the possibility of using them. This is based in Pan-Indian ideas about kingship and in several Buddhist traditions. In the Pali canon, the Buddha abandoned becoming a universal wheel-turning monarch in order to become liberated. This prioritized liberation, and the renunciation of violence and harm that is essential to its realization, yet at the same time gave a secondary legitimacy to political leadership. Such monarchs are portrayed as universally wise and generous but do not abandon the state’s monopoly on force. This model of righteous kingship is the basis for the Buddhist warrior-kings of the Mahavamsa.
{208} Popular Sri Lankan Buddhism incorporates a tacit “just war theory” according to which war is justifiable when fought with the appropriate intent and means. The Sinhalese supporters of war appeal to such ideas of the legitimacy of defensive war, which is defined by the intention to protect rather than greed or hatred. It is interesting that the extreme Sinhalese nationalists, insofar as they still claim to operate within the framework of Buddhism, are forced to appeal to an extended notion of defensive war (i.e., the unity of Sri Lanka as a whole) since Buddhism provides no basis for offensive or aggressive war.[45] Buddhism does not have the tradition of offensive “holy war” and, since motivation and intention are more important than external ritual and obedience, there is no basis for war to convert others by force for their own good.
The first militant nationalistic and second moderate pro-war Sinhalese positions described above are differentiated by the portrayal of what is being defended and what means are justifiable. This remains an active question given the fragility of peace, the continuation of death and destruction, the conflicting assertions about the “righteousness” of each side, and the competing claims about the justice and injustice of military action.
Finally, in a third category of positions, there are Sri Lankan Buddhists who reject all violence as an impediment to nibbana (nirvana) and who have been prominently engaged in promoting the peace process and reconciliation. Bartholomeusz contends that this must be a consequence of giving the first precept of ahimsa a deontological status. That is, it is a universally valid principle and duty that is applicable regardless of circumstances and has no exceptions. The Buddha does not claim that violence is only sometimes wrong but that violence, no matter how righteous, always produces more violence; and warriors, no matter how virtuous, always suffer the consequences of war. However, the Buddhist precepts do not have to be interpreted according to the model of rule based ethics, or applying a conceptual principle to all cases, in order for Buddhists to unconditionally reject war. The most appropriate skillfulness may well generally result in the rejection of violence and war given its personal costs and karmic consequences.
According to the Buddha, “Conquest begets enmity; the conquered live in misery; the peaceful live happily having renounced both conquest and defeat” (Dhammapada, verse 201). This position is in fact the only consistent one with the Pali Canon, if not later non-canonical Sinhalese texts such as the Mahavamsa that are also historically significant in shaping Sinhalese {209} self-interpretations of their own identity and the possibility—albeit limited and tenuous—of a Buddhist theory of “just war.” This difference shows the value of not reducing the normative dimension of Buddhism to its popular manifestations, and of not minimizing canonical texts and the “philosophical” dimension of Buddhism in the face of its “violent” lived reality.[46] Since norms and exemplars are richly embodied in images and narratives, the distinction between normative claims and actual practices does not entail the reduction of Buddhism’s symbolic dimension to an impoverished rationalized shadow. Exemplars and norms often serve a critical, regulative, and self-reforming function, providing a textured fabric and context to which individuals can appeal so as to engage their circumstances and practices differently. If it is illegitimate to isolate and reify supposedly “elite” normative or canonical Buddhism on the authority of “anti-essentialism,” it seems similarly problematic to eliminate all normative and regulative claims in the name of “popular practices.”

6. Conclusion
The Sri Lankan conflict is not a question of one individual’s insight and virtue; it is a structural crisis that requires a political solution that has to rely on a plurality of ethical, religious, and social possibilities and voices. This claim contradicts many current ubiquitous tendencies that (1) seek to privatize social problems into issues of personal virtue or (2) or reduce the plurality of public life to one theological vision of the good life and religious redemption. To the degree that Buddhism shares these features, which is appropriate given its primary goal of spiritual liberation, it is not adequate by itself to resolve structural social-political crises. Like other ethical and religious ideals, Buddhism can become a constituent part of social ills, if the Buddhist does not recognize the independent structural and plural qualities of social-political life. Nonetheless, because of its responsiveness to the suffering of others as well as its self-critical, non-coercive and egalitarian character, Buddhism provides a powerful and cogent individual way of life. And, as such, it can contribute to the resolution of conflict and suffering.
The conclusion that Buddhism is not the primary cause of the Sri Lankan conflict and can be part of its peaceful resolution is not a new thesis. P. D. Premasiri reasonably concludes that there is no place for righteous war within Pali Buddhism: “the idea of a just or righteous war {210} (dharma yuddha) involving the use of weapons of war and violence is conspicuously absent in the Buddhist canon. The Buddha countered the prevailing belief that soldiers of war who fight for a cause could, as a consequence of their rightful performance of duty, aspire to attain a heavenly rebirth if they succumb to their injuries while in combat. According to the Buddha one who fights a war does not generate wholesome thoughts but thoughts of malice and hatred, which are absolutely unwholesome. Therefore, their future destiny will be a woeful one, which is in accordance with their unwholesome kamma.”[47]
According to the argument unfolded in this paper, Buddhism shares some of the potential problems of other varieties of virtue ethics. In particular, (1) moral appropriateness and skillfulness can become a potentially dangerous doctrine legitimating unethical behavior and (2) the ethics of individual self-cultivation of character can become ideologically complicit with systems of exploitation and domination. First, skillfulness can be reduced to an instrumental manipulation of means without regard for the quality of the ends, such that it is removed from its ethical context of loving-kindness, generosity, compassion, and ahimsa. Second, the privatization of the ethical separates questions of character from the reproduction of social-political systems, such that the moralist as well as the ideologue appeals to the good intentions of individuals without regard for underlying relations of power. Socially engaged Buddhists ought to be mindful of both issues if they are to counter the potential betrayal of the moral core of the Dhamma through individual practices and social-political institutions. These possibilities cannot be excluded a priori and indicate the need to be vigilant in cultivating and practicing the art of ethical appropriateness and skillfulness.
Like other forms of context-sensitive ethics, Buddhist ethics cannot be understand according to the model of a single universal rule, such as utility or the categorical imperative. Instead it ought to be seen as developing an ethical mode of comportment and disposition from which one can ethically respond to a variety of new and different circumstances. Without this ethical orientation and context, a decontextualized notion of skillfulness—and appropriate judgment in general—can and has been used to justify violence and war in ways that run contrary to the Buddha’s teachings. Although skillfulness (kusula) can be more believably used to justify less morally problematic forms of violence such as self-defense, and as a consequence potentially providing a limited quasi-Buddhist just-war-theory, it cannot consistently be used to {211} justify aggressive violence and war. Yet if it is not to betray the realization of Dhamma right here in this life, then even such a pragmatically reasonable position goes too far. Despite actual and potential problems with Buddhists, who would like but have not yet realized the Dhamma, it remains a commendable virtue of Buddhism that it provides the means to rigorously question violence and war as well as demanding the proper cultivation of the skillfulness and insight to do so. Such insight means that one is not only attentive to what others do but more importantly to one’s own activities and disposition, even more when one has the self-satisfaction of it seeming most sensible and decent.[48]

Endnotes
[1] Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa, The Path of Purification. Bhikkhu Nanamoli (trans.), (Seattle: Buddhist Publication Society Pariyatti Editions, 1999).
[2] Damien Keown states that “Buddhist ethics is aretaic: it rests upon the cultivation of personal virtue” in The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 2. The view that Mahāyāna involves a kind of virtue ethic has been more extensively developed, especially given the claim that the Bodhisattva’s compassion can override rules. Arguments for Zen and Mahāyāna virtue ethics are found in: Simon P. James, Zen Buddhism and Environmental Ethics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) and David E. Cooper and Simon P. James, Buddhism, Virtue and Environment (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
[3] Keown’s argument for the parallel between Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics (Keown, 2001, ch.8) is problematic given that Aristotle’s phronesis is primarily an aristocratic mastery, an accomplishment of the patriarchal householder and active citizen, whereas Buddhist moral skillfulness (kusala) transcends the ekos and polis to a kind of freedom in relation to people and things. This is not the freedom of indifference but of compassion (karuna, the core virtue) as a spontaneous responsiveness constituted by instead of transcending the ethical. Such freedom evokes one aspect of a different variety of ancient Greco-Roman virtue ethics—the cosmopolitanism of the Cynics and Stoics. Rather than restricting the ethical to the polis, the nation, or even the human, ethical responsiveness extends to all sentient beings and to the world {212} itself. This suggests a kind of Buddhist world-citizenship (cosmo-polis), which is further supported in the traditional paradigm of the cakkavatti as a universal and inclusive wheel-turning monarch.
[4] Most passages cited from SN can be found in the following incomplete translation: The Sutta-Nipata, tr. H. Saddhatissa (Surrey: Curzon, 1994). Numerical Discourses of the Buddha, tr. and ed. Nyanaponika Thera and Bhikkhu Bodhi (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2000) is a selective translation of the Anguttara Nikaya (hereafter cited as AN).
[5] David J. Kalupahana, Ethics in Early Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 100-101.
[6] This expression is developed in Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra R De Silva (eds.), Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998).
[7] Critics of Buddhism often confuse non-attachment and indifference, conflating Stoicism (with its supposed repression of the emotions for the sake of virtue and the equanimity of ataraxia) and Buddhism (which calls for recognizing, working with, and transforming emotions). Another critique would reduce Buddhism to the opposite of indifference—egotistical self-satisfaction and joy in oneself. The idea that Buddhism is sa piritual mental “autoeroticism” and masturbation, because it lacks “religious obligation,” misses its ethical core, which far from denying obligations deepens their necessity (beyond the egoism of reward and punishment) and extends them from human life to all sentient beings. Elizabeth Harris has an interesting analysis of such claims in “Buddhism in the Media” in Karma Lekshe Tsomo (ed.), Innovative Buddhist Women: Swimming against the Stream (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2000). The implausible view that Buddhism aims at Stoic indifference excluding possibilities for transformation is also found in other figures, such as Gillian Rose’s critique of what she calls Levinas’s “Buddhist Judaism” in Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge” Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37-38.
[8] Kalupahana, 1995, 76.
[9] Ananda Abeysekara denies this apparent paradox by arguing that Buddhism cannot be separated into an authentic philosophical discourse stemming from the Buddha and popular violence, since they are contingent and constructed categories, in his Colors of the Robe: {213} Religion, Identity, and Difference (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002), 204. Yet this paradox cannot be evaded if Buddhism does not only consist of practices but normative claims that can potentially problematize those very practices.
[10] Richard Gombrich, Theravada Buddhism (London: Routledge, 1988), 30, 68.
[11] On the general importance of feeling, affective response and moral sentiment in Buddhist thought and practice, see Keown, 2001, 68-78.
[12] Gombrich, 1988, 69.
[13] On the social character of karma and responsibility, see Jonathan S. Walters, “Communal Karma and Karmic Community in Therāvada Buddhist History” in Constituting Communities. Edited by J.C. Holt, J.N. Kinnard, Jonathan S. Walters (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), 9-39, see especially 10, 18, 28. According to Walters, the notion of rebirth in Sri Lankan popular Buddhism only deepens one’s sense of responsibility for others and the social character of karma. My relations with others are unavoidable, given that I am bound to them not only in this life but in others as well. The suffering that I ignore today, because I believe the other person deserves that suffering because of past deeds, will become part of my own suffering.
[14] Compare Rita Gross’s discussion of the claim that Christianity is the source of socially engaged Buddhism in Soaring and Settling: Buddhist Perspectives on Contemporary Social and Religious Issues (New York: Continuum, 1998), 13-18. No doubt the encounter between East and West has promoted contemporary engaged Buddhism, yet this would have remained unlikely if it did not have a basis within Buddhism itself.
[15] See Gombrich, 1988, 70 and 116.
[16] The extent of this complicity and active engagement has become apparent from the work of Brian Daizen Victoria, Zen at War (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) and Zen War Stories (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).
[17] Brian Daizen Victoria, Zen War Stories and Tessa J. Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).
[18] AN, X, 206, also compare AN, IX, 7.
{214} [19] A classic article on such issues in East Asia is: Paul Demiéville, “Le bouddhisme et la guerre. Post-scriptum a l’«Histoire des moines guerriers du Japon» de Gaston Renondeau”, Mélanges publiés par l’Institut des Hautes Etudes chinoises, Tome I, Paris, 1957, 347-385.
[20] AN, XI, 1-2. This point is developed in Gombrich, 1988, 74, 89; Keown, 2001, 50-53.
[21] Gombrich, 1988, 78.
[22] Kalupahana, 1995, 76.
[23] Compare Stanley Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 59.
[24] Tessa J. Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).
[25] Kalupahana, 1995, 95. See ch. 10 (90-95) for his account of moral principle.
[26] Gethin develops this claim against Keown’s position in “Can Killing a Living Being Ever Be an Act of Compassion? The analysis of the act of killing in the Abhidhamma and Pali Commentaries.” Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol. 11, 2004, pp. 168-202.
[27] Two excellent accounts of the history and concept of skillful means in Mahāyāna Buddhism are those of Thomas Kasulis, who traces upaya back to the Abbhidharma, Skillful Means: The Heart of Buddhist Compassion (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001) and Michael Pye, Skilful Means: A Concept in Mahayana Buddhism (London: Routledge, 2004). Also see Keown, 2001, 157-162.
[28] On skillfulness (kusala) as an equivalent term for morality in Therāvada Buddhism, see Gombrich, 1988, 62. On the basic role of kusala in the Pali canon, see Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 42-49.
[29] DN III.220. The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Digha Nikaya, tr. Maurice Walshe (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995), 486, translation modified.
[30] Michael Pye stresses the continuity between pre- Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism and the importance of skillful means for Buddhism in general in Pye, 2004, ch. 7.
[31] MN 9. The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikaya, tr. by Bhikkhu Nanamoli (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995), 93.
{215} [32] AN IX.35, also see AN IX.36 not included in this translation: Numerical Discourses of the Buddha, 235.
[33] The Skill in Means Sutra (Upayakausalya Sutra). Tr. Mark Tatz (New Dehli: Motilal Banarsidass, 2001).
[34] On the strict canonical prohibition of money, and ways of lessening it, see Gombrich, 1988, 103. Also note Harvey, 2000, 203-205.
[35] Keown, 2001, 47-48.
[36] Recent accounts of the LTTE’s uses of terrorism include: Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 70-88; Kingsley de Silva, “Terrorism and political agitation in post-colonial South Asia: Jammu-Kashmir and Sri Lanka” in Ramesh Thakur and Oddny Wiggen (eds.), South Asia in the World: Problem-Solving Perspectives on Security, Sustainable Development, and Good Governance (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004), ch. 7; Shri D.R. Kaarthikeyan, “Root Causes of Terrorism? A Case Study of the Tamil Insurgency and the LTTE” in Tore Bjørgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward (London: Routledge, 2005), ch. 10.
[37] Although some justify the violence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam as a legitimate response to Sinhalese nationalism, it should be kept in mind that the LTTE is “just as fanatically committed to a particular authoritarian agenda as the JVP and just as strongly nationalist. The Tamil Tigers' compulsive resort to terror has earned them, too, a justifiable comparison to the Khmer Rouge.” P. 97, K. M. de Silva, “Sri Lanka: Surviving Ethnic Strife.” Journal of Democracy, 8.1 (1997) 97-111.
[38] The Mahavamsa: The Great Chronicle of Sri Lanka (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1999). For a detailed account of the legacy of the Mahavamsa, see Steven Kemper, The Presence of the Past (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
[39] Mahinda Deegalle, “Therāvada Attitudes towards Violence.” Bath Conference on Buddhism and Conflict in Sri Lanka. Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol. 10, 2003. Also compare Gombrich, 1988, 141-142; Harvey, 2000, 255-260.
[40] On the question of The Mahavamsa, nationalism, and mythic violence, see John Clifford Holt, The Buddhist Viṣṇu (New York: Columbia University Press), 63-65, 93-94, 266-267. Also note {216} the descriptions in Gombrich, 1988, 141-142; Harvey, 2000, 255-258. Steven Kemper also emphasizes the role of colonial and other westernizing forces in the creation of modern Sinhalese nationalism (Kemper, 1991, 196-214).
[41] Bartholomeusz, 2002, 16.
[42] Neil DeVotta, “Illiberalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka.” Journal of Democracy, 13.1 (2002), 83.
[43] Bartholomeusz, 2002, 26-29.
[44] See in particular Trevor Oswald Ling, Buddhism, Imperialism and War: Burma and Thailand in Modern History (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1979).
[45] Bartholomeusz, 2002, 121-123.
[46] Compare ibid., 110.
[47] P. D. Premasiri, “The Place for a Righteous War in Buddhism.” Bath Conference on Buddhism and Conflict in Sri Lanka. Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol. 10, 2003.
[48] I would like to thank Lori Witthaus and Namita Goswami for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. This paper incorporates some material from Eric Sean Nelson, Buddhism and War: Two Reviews; Brian Daizen Victoria, Zen War Stories (Routledge, 2003); Tessa J. Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka (Routledge, 2002). Journal of Military Ethics, 2003, 2:3, pp. 252-255.